Chapter 4 - Poppy Cultivation in AfghanistanAfghanistan is an agricultural country. However, due to rough topography and arid climate it has little land available for agricultural operation. About 12-15% of its total land is arable. Less than half of the arable land is under cultivation and about half of the cultivated land is irrigated. More than four decades of conflict, instability, frequent droughts, and migration greatly reduced the agricultural production in Afghanistan. Most of the irrigation channels and agriculture related infrastructures were damaged in war, or were in poor condition due to lack of maintenance. Also, poor soil, small land holdings, little use of fertilizers and pesticides, lack of good quality seeds, dearth of access to the markets, and absence of storage and processing facilities hampered agricultural production. Despite all these obstacles, 70-80% Afghans still rely on agriculture because no other job opportunities are available to them. According to a World bank report one fourth of the country's gross domestic production is from agriculture (World Bank, 2013). Afghanistan's common licit crops include corn, sugar beet, cotton, wheat, tobacco, rice, castor beans, fruits, and vegetables. While illicit crops are opium and cannabis. Until 2022 Afghanistan was a top producer of opium (Table 1), producing 90% of the world's opiates. Poppy was the number one cash crop of the country, engaging more than 2 million farmers. In April 2022 Taliban government had imposed a ban on cultivation of poppy and all related activities like processing, trade and transportation of opium and other narcotics. The year 2023 saw a significant decline in poppy production. A similar ban was also imposed during the year 2000, which effectively halted opium production in 2001. Table 1. Area cultivated (in 1000 hectares) with poppy crop and opium production (in Metric tons).
Poppy was never a traditional crop of Afghanistan. Previously its cultivation was limited, and restricted to medicinal purposes. However, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, poppy cultivation was increased, and the product reached the international market. It was used mainly to finance local commanders to fight the Russian invasion. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the US and Western countries discontinued their support to the fighters, and this further increased their dependence on poppy money. In the absence of a stable government in the country, a civil war broke out. It turned freedom fighters into warlords and led to anarchy in the country. This phenomenon helped the poppy economy to flourish in Afghanistan. The rise in Afghan poppy cultivation also coincided with the anti-poppy campaigns in neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan during the seventies which almost halted poppy production in these countries. Concurrently, anarchy in Afghanistan led drug kingpins to make this country a new hub for their illicit trade. After the end of Taliban rule in 2001, numbers of refugee and internally displaced farmers returned to their lands after 20 years. It was very difficult for the returning farmers to regain their previous livelihood due to loss of agricultural infrastructure and lack of resources. Poppy cultivation helped them, in many areas, to survive and re-establish in their ancestral villages. Afghan farmers are growing poppies purely for economic reasons (Table 2). It is easier to obtain loans and lease/rent a piece of land for poppy cultivation than for cultivating any other crop. Soil in Helmand and other poppy growing areas also suit poppy farming. Poppy is more drought resistant than many other crops and its product, opium, can easily be stored, transported and sold. High profit margin also encouraged farmers to grow poppy to provide livings for their families and pay debts even from a small piece of land they own or rent. Table 2. Comparison of income from poppy and wheat crops per hectare in US dollars.
The easy availability of opium and heroin (a refined product of opium) in the country has significantly increased the number of drug addicts in Afghanistan. It was estimated in 2009 that about one million Afghans are drug addicts and were at a high risk of exposure to HIV and other diseases associated with the injection use of the drug (UNODC 2009). However, now the number of drug users has significantly increased. The survey also pointed out a continuous rise in heroin use both in rural and urban populations. A study (Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey 2015) tested 9% of Afghan children under the age of 14, positive for drugs, mostly opiates. As 90% of these children were not active drug users, hence it is assumed that these children were being provided the drug by adults or exposed to secondhand smoke or third hand residues at home. Also, there are millions of drug addicts around the world who are dependent on Afghan poppy, especially in Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and Europe. In addition, drug production and trade are fostering instability, conflict, criminality, and corruption in the region. During the presence of ISAF in Afghanistan various programs, with the help of international partners, were in place to discourage poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. UNDOC has reported the implementation of more than100 projects, solely on providing alternative livelihood in poppy growing areas with a total cost of US $ 1.2 billion for 10 years (UNODC 2005). The Afghan government at that time established a Ministry of Counter Narcotic (MCN) supported by Counter Narcotic Police, Special Narcotic Force and Counter Narcotic Criminal Justice Task Force to curb poppy cultivation. In addition, other ministries, including the Ministry of interior, ministry of rural development and Ministry of agriculture were also helping MCN to achieve its objectives. Further, billions of dollars had been invested in the country by international partners for infrastructure development including agriculture. Despite all these efforts, poppy production was rising. Main reasons for this failure are limited natural resources, lack of farm to market roads, little or no off-farm job opportunities, small land holdings, high cost of production (specially on leased lands), poor soils, water losses due to damaged and inefficient irrigation channels, inability of government to provide services and lack of support price or incentives for licit crops production. Also, poppy trade is a source of income for Taliban fighters, but they were not the only ones who were generating the revenue from this trade, various criminal warlords, parliamentarians, and government-officials (especially security forces) are also benefiting from the poppy production, processing, and smuggling. Afghanistan is an agrarian country with a rural economy. Seventy eight percent of its population live in rural areas while 7% are nomads (GIRoA, 2005). Most of these farmers are poor, with very limited resources. They are struggling to secure food and living conditions conducive to their existence. Eradicating poppy in highly poppy dependent areas, without providing convincing alternative livelihood options may bring enormous difficulties to the farmers. They will face a sharp decline in their income, increased indebtedness, loss of assets and food insecurity. Therefore, counter narcotic approaches should be linked to the rural development strategies that can provide alternative livelihood along with the government services. Although the present Taliban government has recently banned the poppy cultivation, it will be impossible for the government to provide alternate livelihood to the poppy farmers in the absence of international aid and support. Hence poverty will increase further and will prevent investment in licit crop production and may result in migration and criminal activities. The United Nations has also emphasized that before considering eradication as a counter narcotic measure, a state should ensure that small-farmer households had adopted viable and sustainable livelihoods (UNODC 2009). Previous Afghan government’s counter narcotic (CN) strategy was also focused on providing alternative livelihood to the farmers in poppy growing areas thus preferring interdiction on eradication (MCN, 2006. National drug control strategy. An updated five-year strategy for tackling the illicit drug problem. Kabul, Afghanistan). However, every year, during the months of February to April, many district administrations in Afghanistan were performing the rituals of eradicating poppy under a US funded program, Governor Led Eradication (GLE), commonly known as "campaign". This program was solely centered on physical destruction of standing poppy crops, without confirming that alternatives livelihood options were available to the farmers or not. All these eradication efforts were not in line with the CN strategy of any agency involved in CN efforts. Afghan MCN has clearly mentioned in its CN strategy that eradication should only be implemented in pre-notified areas, where MCN believes that farmers are not heavily dependent on poppy cultivation and at least some alternative livelihood opportunities are available to them. I witnessed a couple of campaigns in the Khanashin area and noticed that the provincial governor, district governor and security forces commanders were using the opportunity to intimidate local farmers and fetch some money. In 2011, during an eradication campaign in Khanashin, an angry farmer approached US soldiers and told them that he would kill his family and himself because the US soldiers had destroyed his poppy field, and he was left with nothing to feed his family for the whole year. Although US soldiers were not involved in destroying the poppy crop, they were present during such campaigns to provide security to Afghan Security Forces. During a similar campaign in Marjah, a village elders asked the US soldiers why they were destroying the poppy field. The US soldiers responded that they were not, but the Afghanistan government eradicated the crop. The elders responded that Afghan security forces could not destroy their crops without the help of US forces. Mathew Rosenberg (2012), while reporting the views of American officers in Afghanistan wrote "US and allies prefer to focus on interdiction at the trafficking stage of the opium trade. But the government continues to eradicate poppy fields, financed by the US, compounding the problem. Government officials often made inequitable decisions about where to eradicate, ignoring allies who grow poppy and focusing instead on personal enemies or those who are not tied into the local power structure” Also, many eradication campaigns were marred with fatal security incidents. Constant increase in poppy cultivation since 2010 indicates ineffectiveness of those poppy eradication campaigns. The ban imposed on poppy cultivation in 2023 apparently seems very effective just like one in 2001 before the invasion of the USA in Afghanistan. However, we may see consequences of this ban in the near future if the present government and international community fail to provide reasonable resources to help poor farmers to adopt alternative livelihood while staying in their villages and cultivating their lands. However, there were quarters suggesting for taking a very aggressive approach on the counter narcotic front instead of a gradual approach to deal with the opium economy. In 2005 Afghan interior minister advocated a prompt action on the CN front to achieve quick results. Otherwise, he expected, the drug lords would take over and transform Afghanistan into a Narco-State (Koehler, J., 2005). It is true that the opium economy can deteriorate security, increase corruption, and drug use, but it is also an important source of jobs and income for the survival of many Afghan families. There is nothing in Afghanistan that produces more jobs than the opium poppy economy. It is generally agreed that any immediate success without providing alternative livelihood opportunities will be very fragile. UNODC considers that if farmers were not provided with alternative livelihood, either they will continue growing poppy, migrate, or join criminal activities. Until security, governance and socio-economic conditions are improved, spur to grow poppy will remain large for the farmers in many areas of Afghanistan. It is time for the international community to support Afghanistan to achieve long lasting peace and eradicate or control poppy production. References used: Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GiRoA), 2005. Afghan Statistical yearbook 2004. Central Statistical Office, Kabul, Afghanistan. Koehler, J., 2005. Quoted from Koehler, J., 2005. Conflict processing and opium economy of Afghanistan. PAL Internal Document No. 5, Jalalabad, Afghanistan (interview notes by Jan Koehler on Feb. 16, 2005). Mathew Rosenberg, 2012. A maze of complications in Afghan poppy fields. The New York Time, May 29, 2012. SGI-Global. 2015. Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey. Quoted from ISSUP-Knowledge share. https://www.issup.net/knowledge-share/resources/2016-10/afghanistan-national-drug-use-survey-2015. UNODC 2005. Mapping of alternative livelihood projects. UNODC and Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Government of Afghanistan. https://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/publications/alternative_livelihoods_database_mapping_report_02.pdf UNODC 2009. Drug use in Afghanistan - A Survey - Executive Summary. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna, Austria. UNODC 2009. Political declaration and plan of action on international cooperation toward integrated and balanced strategy to counter the world drug problem. A high - level segment commission on narcotic drugs. Vienna, 11-12 March 2009. UNODC & MCN. 2011. Afghan Cannabis Survey 2010. www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Cannabis_Survey_Report_2010_smallwcover.pdf World Bank (2013). Country Review: Afghanistan. www.worldbank.org. |
 A detoriated water channel
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